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Abstract: Safety is now a major concern in many complex systems such as medical robots. 
A way to control the complexity of such systems is to manage risk. The first and 
important step of this activity is risk analysis. During risk analysis, two main 
studies concerning human factors must be integrated: task analysis and human 
error analysis. This multidisciplinary analysis often leads to a work sharing 
between several stakeholders who use their own languages and techniques. This 
often produces consistency errors and understanding difficulties between them. 
Hence, this paper proposes to treat the risk analysis on the common expression 
language UML (Unified Modeling Language) and to handle human factors 
concepts for task analysis and human error analysis based on the features of this 
language. The approach is applied to the development of a medical robot for tele-
echography. 
Keywords: safety; risk analysis; system modeling; UML; task analysis; human error analysis; 
medical robot. 
1. MOTIVATIONS 
Today systems being more complex, and more responsibilities being 
transfered to them [1], safety requirement is becoming critical. Safety, 
previously defined as an absolute property [2], is also now expressed in a 
relative and probabilistic way as the property of a system to be “free from 
unacceptable risk” [3]. Therefore it is necessary to reduce the risk to an 
acceptable level with a complete risk management process [4], including 
activities presented on the left part of the figure 1. This approach has been used  
 
 
 Figure 1. Human factors and UML based risk analysis in the risk management activity 
into different domains. For example, some of its concepts can be found in the 
medical standards [5]. Inside the general risk management activity, our study 
focuses on the first step: the risk analysis. This step aims at identifying hazards 
and estimating their associated risk (probability and severity). During this 
phase, various techniques can be used to handle functional and technological 
issues such as Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), Failure Modes, Effects and 
Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) techniques [6,7] 
as presented on the right part of figure 1.   
The interaction between human and technological systems plays a major 
role in safety. Nevertheless, the integration of human factors in the risk 
management standards is still in work [8,9]. Based on this research, we focus on 
two main activities of human factors studies which are particularly important 
during risk analysis: "task analysis" for which the system and its intended use 
are described and "human error analysis" to identify new hazards and estimate 
their risks. These two phases are presented on the right part of figure 1. The 
second phase is implemented using FMECA [10].  
Both activities are based on a system model. Ideally, the system definition is 
formally modeled. In practice, the use of formal methods in industrial 
development is still rare. A significant barrier is that many formal languages 
and analysis techniques are unfamiliar and difficult to apply for engineers. 
Moreover, several modeling tools have to be used to treat particular and partial 
aspects of the system. Designers must also communicate between specialists of 
different domains who usually have their own language. To handle this issue, 
we considered UML (Unified Modeling Language), which is now a standard   
in system and software engineering, even if this language presents several 
drawbacks (for instance, it has no formal semantics). 
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 Figure 2. TER system overview 
This paper presents how task analysis and human error analysis can be 
integrated in risk analysis and how UML can be useful to perform them. We 
will present some UML features to graphically specify tasks and to analyze 
them. Thus, section 2 exposes task analysis during system definition in UML 
and section 3 proposes an approach based on FMECA and UML message error 
models applied to human error analysis.  
Each section is illustrated on a system for Robotic Tele-Echography (TER) 
[11]. TER is a tele-robotic system designed and developed by a French 
consortium composed of universities, hospitals and industrial companies. The 
slave robot is tele-operated by an expert clinician who remotely performs the 
ultrasound scan examination. A virtual probe is mounted on the master interface 
device. The real probe is placed on the slave robot end-effector. The slave robot 
is actuated with artificial muscles (pneumatic actuators). An overview of TER 
is provided on figure 2. We will focus on the computer control system of the 
slave site, whose safety is critical. 
2. TASK ANALYSIS DURING SYSTEM 
DEFINITION WITH UML 
Task analysis aims at identifying the details of specified tasks, including the 
knowledge, skills, attitudes, and personal characteristics required for successful 
task performance. During system analysis, this activity is linked to task 
allocation which aims at determining the distribution of work between human 
actors and machines. For instance, it is particularly important to define non 
ambiguous and consistent tasks for humans who are using the robot. 
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2.1 Related work 
These activities are usually performed with different algorithms ([12,pp.231-
236], [13] and [14]). Although there are a variety of techniques [15], the 
integration of task analysis in system modeling is still under development [16]. 
In this regard, many workshops aim at integrating human factors in system 
modeling [17], and more particularly in object oriented modeling [18,19]. Many 
studies compare use cases (based on Cockburn [20] definition which is closed 
to Jacobson's one [21]) and task analysis for interactive systems [22,23]. This 
was also applied for medical robots [24,25]. In those studies, use cases are 
usually derived from existing task analysis, and often led to the business 
modeling [26] like in [27]. Other authors study how to correlate task analysis  
and object oriented concepts, in order to model tasks themselves [28,29,30] for 
further human machine interface design.  
Most of those theories are developed to design user interfaces. Our purpose 
is to provide a method to prevent hazards due to a bad task definition and 
allocation but also to provide models for human error analysis. This led us to 
analyze and model tasks with interaction diagrams, even if this "scenario-
based" approach is sometimes opposed to "task-based" analysis as discussed in 
[31].  
2.2 Business modeling 
We first model the business without the technological system (ultrasound 
scan examination), with UML use cases and interaction diagrams 
(collaboration and sequence diagrams). During this step, "business modeling 
increases the understanding of the business and facilitates communication about 
the business" [26], particularly between engineers and doctors. For the 
considered example, the use case diagram in figure 3 models the common 
ultrasound scan examination without the robot system. Based on this diagram, 
the TER system is later integrated in the requirement modeling in the next 
diagrams.  
Structuring the business with use cases helps the designers for the task 
allocation. For each use case, a textual description specifies more precisely the 
possible scenarios and their conditions of execution. Even if the use case 
Perform Ultrasound Scan seems to be the most important for the design, three 
other use  cases have  to be analyzed  which can be  later critical for the safety. 
Indeed, during the ultrasound scan examination the specialist can 
simultaneously manage the probe (change the settings), interact with the patient 
(communicate, prepare the surface to scan, etc.) and even diagnose. Hence, the 
future system should allow to perform all those use cases safely. 
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 Figure 3. Use case diagram: global view of ultrasound scan examination 
 
This notation completed with textual documents (or even task analysis 
studies) improves the communication between medical specialists and system 
designers. Based on this diagram, it is easier to allocate tasks between humans 
and systems. From the system analysis viewpoint, this documentation leads to 
design choices such as the system architecture presented on figure 2 (master 
and slave sites, bidirectional communication, etc.). Considering that the future 
system will integrate a robot, the other business is the use of a robot. This led to 
identify two generic use cases which are Perform a task and Robot 
management, but also two actors: the Operator and the Robot itself.  
2.3 From business modeling to robotic system modeling 
In this phase, we integrate the use cases of a robotic system into the use case 
diagram of the ultra sound scan examination (figure 3). This led to modify 
specifications of previous use cases. New actors are then identified. An actor 
characterizes an outside user or related set of users who interact with the system 
[4]. It is possible for an actor to be a human user (like the Specialist in the 
previous section) or an external system. This is really useful in socio-technical 
systems, and particularly in the TER project. We choose to represent two 
external systems as actors: the Master Site and the slave Robot. The Master Site 
replaces the actor Specialist (see figure 3) who is in charge of performing the 
examination. It is important to observe that the use case Diagnose has also 
disappeared, being transfered to the master site. 
The use case diagram of figure 4 shows an allocation of work between 
actors. On this diagram, the boundaries of the computer control system are 
defined. It has been determined "which of the requirements are system 
requirements, which are requirements for the operational processes associated 
with  the  system  and  which requirements should  be  outside the scope of the 
system" [33]. This means that we have decided for each use case if it belongs or  
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Figure 4. Use case diagram with Control System boundaries 
 
not to the system. For instance, the use case Probe Management has been 
removed from this use case diagram because it does not belong to or has any 
interaction with the computer control system. 
2.4 Tasks description 
We chose to specify tasks and subtasks with the UML concept of message. 
On sequence diagram figure 5, the main scenario of the use case Install/Init 
Control System is presented. This diagram can also be refined. For instance the 
Operator has to Prepare Patient, which can be detailed in: position the patient, 
put ultrasound scan gel on patient's body, give information to the patient, 
monitor the patient, etc. This notation of tasks is also useful to specify a 
sequence order, which can be essential for safety. By definition, sequence 
diagrams just specify possible scenarios (descriptive models). Nevertheless we 
use those diagrams as prescriptive models to establish a safe order of messages, 
because they are easily readable by non experts of UML modeling. 
These models can directly be used for different safety-dependent tasks: 
writing of a user-guide (using the sequence diagrams), specifying and designing 
the Human-Machine Interface (HMI) and furnishing models for the 
specification of the system. It is important to note that in such robot systems, 
HMI includes the robot-human interface (control panels, teach pendant, etc.), 
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 Figure 5. Sequence diagram of installation of the whole system 
but also the robot itself (in the TER project the slave robot is always in contact 
with the patient's body). 
3. UML BASED FMECA FOR HUMAN ERROR 
ANALYSIS 
As a potential source of harm (a hazard), human error has to be analyzed 
during the step of hazard identification and risk estimation. Although there is a 
variety of techniques (the most relevant and complete technique is certainly the 
Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction [34,35]) and tools [36], the 
complexity of human error classification and cognitive theory [37] usually leads 
engineers to the use of design checklists and guidelines [2] for the design of 
human computer interfaces. Nevertheless, as noted in [38], guidelines are not 
sufficient for innovative projects as medical robots. 
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3.1 Message failure mode analysis 
The notion of failure mode is close to the notion of error; both concepts will 
be indifferently used in this section. In order to perform human error analysis, 
we have based our approach on several points. First, to be consistent with the 
previous section, we focus on a task-based analysis, quickly usable for non-
specialist of human error. As proposed in [39], we do not have ethnographic 
studies and cognitive task analysis to perform the analysis. Thus, we only based 
our analysis on a set of models of scenarios, interface proposals, and human 
errors models. 
Second, in order to reduce the number of analysis and modeling techniques, 
we propose to perform the human error identification and analysis with the well 
known analytical method FMECA. Among analytical methods allowing fault 
forecasting, FMECA [10] is certainly the most used during functional analysis. 
In an object oriented model, actors are represented as objects sending messages 
to the system. Hence, FMECA has to be conducted based on object concepts. 
This has been applied to object oriented elements such as components software 
[40], object methods [41], or use cases [42]. In those cases, the authors perform 
analysis focusing on functional aspects of object oriented models. On the 
contrary, the main idea of our approach is to propose an object oriented 
FMECA as we have previously done [43], and to apply it to objects such as 
actors. 
The FMECA technique consists at first in identifying errors. These errors 
are often specific to the application. However, to realize a more systematic error 
identification step, one can sometimes use some generic error models. Those 
error models are related to generic elements of the system. In our approach we 
chose to focus on a central element of the UML dynamic diagram: the message. 
The concept of Action is also an important feature of UML to describe 
behaviors. But we did not handle this feature because its semantics changed a 
lot from version UML specification 1.4 [44] to 1.5 [45] and now to 2.0 [46]. 
3.2 Message error models 
Most of language specifications contains operational semantics as well as 
verification semantics. The operational semantics is used to specify system 
functional aspects and to describe how the system will deliver the service. Most 
of UML diagrams belongs to operational semantics. The verification semantics 
defines properties associated with the correct use of features of the language. 
Some elements in the UML specification belong to the verification semantics. 
For instance, the use of constraints, graphically represented with curly brackets, 
allows to specify a restriction on a modeling element. There are also in UML  
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 Figure 6. Elements of an interaction realized by the exchange of two messages 
 
the Well-Formedness Rules, which define a set of constraints expressed with the 
OCL language [44]. These constraint violations specify generic errors.  
However, most of verification properties are not explicitly provided in the UML 
standard. They are often implicitly integrated into the operational semantics, 
and thus they have to be deduced studying each feature of UML. As previously 
mentioned, our study focused on the Message feature. 
A message can be a signal creation, an operation call, a creation or 
destruction of an instance. The graphical representation by a sequence diagram 
is illustrated on figure 6. The different elements of a message are: the 
interaction it belongs, the next and previous messages in the interaction, the 
objects that send and receive the message, the sending and receiving events, the 
parameters (number, type and value), the implicit response (defined by its 
arguments, sending and receiving events), and the period of the message 
treatment. 
Based on those elements we identify eleven error models (see [43] for 
details):  
E.1. Sending of a message not belonging to the planned interaction. 
E.2. Execution of one or several messages in a wrong order. 
E.3. Omission of a message among an interaction. 
E.4. Lack of an instance to receive the message. 
E.5. Sending or receiving of a message outside its specified time limits (too 
soon or too late). 
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E.6. The arguments type is different from the type of parameters expected by 
the receiver. 
E.7. The number of message arguments is different from the number of 
parameters expected by the receiver. 
E.8. The value of message arguments is different from the value of 
parameters expected by the receiver. 
E.9. The values returned by a response to a message do not fit with the 
expected values (for example: constant, random, out of limits, etc.). 
E.10. Treatment of a message out of the specified time limits. 
E.11. Lack of link between sender and receiver objects. 
3.3 Proposition of a generic FMECA array for a system 
analysis 
The error models been specified, their effects on system harm risk have to 
be studied. To handle this activity, we tuned the FMECA array [10] (originally 
devoted to functional analysis). This section proposes to introduce the 
following elements into the FMECA array for a message failure mode analysis 
(see figure 7): the interaction or the message name, the failure modes or the 
errors identified thanks to the previous error models, the causes of those failure 
modes, the effects at a local, higher or system level, the data to estimate the risk 
(severity is the harm seriousness, and failure mode occurrence is noted as 
probability), the on-line means to detect failure modes and their effects, the 
possible means for risk prevention and protection and other pieces of 
information. 
Note that the goal in these arrays is not to proceed to a deep analysis of each 
of the mentioned points; in particular, the aim is not to consider the causes of 
the causes but to synthesize the main data in order to obtain a system analysis.  
The Potential solutions of the array deal with the possible means to reduce 
the risk. It is important to notice that these means are not directly implemented 
but this highlights that a preliminary risk evaluation must be done. Risk is here 
calculated from a qualitative estimation of the probability of occurrence of a 
failure mode and of the severity of the induced harm. We chose to represent the 
prevention and protection means in order to reduce the probability or the 
severity of the considered harm.  
This FMECA was essentially useful to focus on critical and weak design 
points from the safety point of view. Moreover, as FMECA directly depends on 
the model level of details, its use depends on the development process step. In 
our approach, we recommend to concentrate on the first steps, when safety 
requirements, architecture choices and major hazards are identified. 
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 Figure 7. Example of a table of FMECA for the message  
"Set air pressure in artificial muscles" 
3.4 Application to the analysis of messages sent by actors 
This section presents an example of use of error models previously 
identified (section 3.2) in order to demonstrate the tractability of the analysis 
proposed in section 3.3 for human error analysis. This approach has been 
successfully applied to medical robot system TER as presented in [6]. 
3.4.1 Types of errors 
Merely all the error models previously identified can be applied for human 
error analysis. Common errors are the occurrence of an action of the actor not 
belonging to the planned interaction (error E.1), the execution of actions in a 
wrong order (E.2), and the omission of an action during an interaction (E.3). It 
is also possible to note human errors such as E.6, E.7 and E.8 consisting in 
furnishing bad data to the system. For instance, a user can type a letter whereas 
the system is waiting for a number (E.6), or he/she can tune a pressure valve too 
high for the system (E.8). The error E.4 is rather rare in human error analysis 
because it implies that the object for the interface is absent. The error E.5 
depends on the time constraints a system can have, and is based on non 
functional requirements as for the error E.10. The error model E.9 which 
concerns response of a message (return values) is really useful for software or 
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electronic components analysis. In case of the human component this is equal to 
E.6, E.7 and E.8, for message coming from the system. 
3.4.2 Failure mode analysis 
The modeling of all exchanged messages with UML sequence diagrams 
allows to perform an analysis very soon in the development. It can lead to 
formulate safety requirements from the start, without detailing design choices. 
Types of error are integrated in tables of an FMECA analysis in the column 
"Failure modes". For instance, we consider the message Set air pressure in 
artificial muscles from figure 5. As shown in figure 7, we identify three failure 
modes (the number has been reduced to present this example) from error 
models. In order to determine other columns data, we have to study all the 
UML models such state diagrams and class diagrams. Those diagrams are not 
presented here but can be found in [6,25]. For instance, those diagrams are used 
to determine effects of the failure modes on actors (column “Effects”). We 
proposed to use a scale for harm severity with five levels: negligible (5), minor 
(4), major (3), sever (2), catastrophic (1). Then, during a FMECA, it is easier to 
estimate the probability of the failure mode leading to the harm rather than the 
probability of the harm itself. Considering that a quantitative evaluation of the 
probability of occurrence of a human error is impossible to perform, we only do 
a qualitative estimation with different levels of probability of occurrence: 
frequent, probable, occasional, rare, and impossible. This point has to be 
developed, and relied to our type of errors. We have determined types of human 
errors that can appear in a human-machine interaction, but the causes are not 
integrated. In this table it is possible to highlight some important data missing 
for the analysis (like the maximum limit of air pressure in the converters). 
4. CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES 
The risk analysis approach proposed in this paper is motivated by the 
growing system complexity and safety requirements. At this stage, the human-
centered approach of UML is twofold: a scenario-based task analysis and a 
message-based human error analysis. 
We have shown that a scenario-based analysis performed throughout use 
case modeling helps designers in describing tasks. UML diagrams are initiated 
by UML specialists and further proposed to the other actors of the development 
process. This approach leads to a more consistent task allocation and to produce 
models that are useful in subsequent development steps. 
Eleven error models have been presented. They are related to the concept of 
message in UML. In this paper, the object-oriented approach is linked to the 
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FMECA functional risk analysis technique. Error models are integrated into 
FMECA. The resulting approach enables the various actors of the development 
process to use the same models.  
This approach was applied successfully to the development of a first 
prototype of a medical robot for tele-echography. Others studies will be 
performed in different fields to complete and validate this work. The next 
technical step would be the development of tools to automatically integrate 
FMECA to UML design diagrams. We also need to go further in human error 
modeling to provide diagrams to understand how our types of error can be 
generated. Finally, a complete error model associated with the UML features is 
under development.  
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